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Abstract
Social epistemologists have argued that high risk, high reward science has an important role
to play in scientific communities. Recently, though, it has also been argued that various
scientific fields seem to be trending towards conservatism—the increasing production of
what Kuhn (1970) might have called ‘normal science’. This paper will explore a possible
explanation for this sort of trend: that the process by which scientific research groups form,
grow, and dissolve might be inherently hostile to such science. In particular, I employ a
paradigm developed by Smaldino and McElreath (2016) that treats a scientific community
as a population undergoing selection. As will become clear, perhaps counter-intuitively this
sort of process in some ways promotes high risk, high reward science. But, as I will point out,
risky science is, in general, the sort of thing that is hard to repeat. While more conservative
scientists will be able to train students capable of continuing their successful projects, and
so create thriving lineages, successful risky science may not be the sort of thing one can
easily pass on. In such cases, the structure of scientific communities selects against high
risk, high rewards projects. More generally, this project makes clear that there are at least
two processes to consider in thinking about how incentives shape scientific communities—
the process by which individual scientists make choices about their careers and research,
and the selective process governing the formation of new research groups.
1. Introduction
Social epistemologists have argued that high risk, high reward science has an important
role to play in scientific communities. Risky science may open new and exciting areas of
exploration. Those responsible for such ventures may go on to found new fields, often to
great acclaim. Nonetheless, some authors have recently argued that various scientific fields
seem to be trending towards conservatism—the increasing production of what Kuhn might
have called ‘normal science’ (Luukkonen, 2012). Funding bodies like NIH have recently
introduced grants intended to reverse this perceived trend.1 Stanford (2015) outlines some
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of the causal factors potentially implicated in increasing scientific conservativism, including
the impact of funding bodies, the role of peer review in publication, the increasing age of
new primary investigators (PIs), and severe competition for academic positions which might
discourage risk taking.2
This paper will explore a different possible cause for trends toward conservatism in
science. As I will argue, the process by which scientific research groups form, produce,
and dissolve might be inherently hostile to high risk, high reward science. In particular, I
employ a paradigm developed by Smaldino and McElreath (2016) that models a scientific
community as a population undergoing a type of selection. The idea is that lab groups have
different practices which contribute to their success, and which thus influence the likelihood
that students from these labs end up forming their own labs. On the reasonable assumption
that students tend to adopt some of the practices of their academic advisors, we then have
the three key ingredients of a Darwinian process—variation, selection on this variation, and
heritability of variation (Godfrey-Smith, 2009).
I will first consider the possibility that the significant chance of failure for high risk science
means that fewer scientific mavericks will influence the next crop of successful scientists.
While this is the case, in fact the sort of selection process modeled here actually gives an
advantage to high risk, high reward science. Since labs that take risks tend to have a greater
variance in terms of their success, many of them will not tend to place students. But the
most successful of them will be so successful that they will have an out-sized impact on the
scientific community. This is especially true when academic competition is fierce, counter
to the suggestion from Stanford (2015) that competitive environments dampen risk-taking
in science.
As I will point out, though, successful risky science is often hard to repeat. While more
conservative scientists will be able to train students capable of continuing their successful
projects, and so create thriving lineages, successful risky science may not be the sort of thing
one can easily pass on. In biological terms, success for risk-takers may not be as heritable as
for conservative science. Inasmuch as this is right, I will show how the structure of scientific
communities will select against high risk, high reward projects.
I conclude by discussing the relevance of these simple models to our understanding of
scientific communities and to scientific progress. While idealized models like those presented
here can play many roles in argumentation3, the ones in this paper fall most squarely under
‘how-possibly’ modeling and also as tools for thought experiments and aids to reasoning.
They also give a more general proof-of-possibility by illustrating how credit incentives in sci-
ence can work at two different levels. Incentives influence the choices of individual scientists,
but also the selection of methods and practices at the community level. As I will highlight,
sometimes influences at these two levels will have different effects, meaning that in assessing
potential interventions on scientific communities both levels should be taken into account.
2Currie (2017) also discusses these and other aspects of science that promote conservatism. Kummerfeld
and Zollman (2015) argue that there is a free rider problem where every scientist should want to avoid risky
experimentation and let others do it. The implication is that rational choice considerations should drive
scientists towards conservative projects
3See Downes (1992); Gru¨ne-Yanoff (2013); O’Connor and Weatherall (2016).
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In section 2, I discuss the distinction between high risk, high reward science, and conser-
vative science. Although this divide is a coarse one, it is nonetheless a useful distinction for
the current exploration. In section 3, I introduce the framework developed by Smaldino and
McElreath (2016) and describe, in detail, the model presented in this paper. Section 4 de-
scribes results from these models, showing, in particular, how the risk/reward trade-off will
help determine whether high risk, high reward science is ‘selected’ in academic communities,
and also demonstrating how the inherent uncertainty in risky science may make it the sort
of thing that cannot be effectively passed on. Section 5 includes a discussion of what sorts
of epistemic roles these models can play, and what they tell us about risky science.
2. Risky Science and Conservative Science
The distinction between normal and revolutionary science goes back to Kuhn (1970), who
contrasted work that proceeds incrementally within a well established paradigm with work
that seeks to develop a new paradigm. In fact there is not always a clear dividing line between
conservative science and innovative, groundbreaking, or maverick-y science. This said, in
the extreme cases we can distinguish science that takes small bites, moves along well worn
pathways, and follows establishment rules from science that bucks establishment trends and
attempts ambitious projects. Examples of the first sort might include the herpetologist who
painstakingly documents features of a new species of newt in the rain forests of Costa Rica,
or the neurobiologist who knocks out a series of genes related to amygdala development and
documents the effects on developing chick embryos, or the economist who analyzes one more
variant of a model of household bargaining. In the second category we might include those
who attempt to outline new unifying physical theories, or who suggest spraying reflective
particles out of hot air balloons to prevent global warming, or who develop new hypotheses
on the origins of life. In between we can identify examples of science that is more or less
groundbreaking or innovative.
Sometimes conservative science pays off in big ways, both epistemically and in terms of
credit for scientists. A classic example comes from Alexander Fleming’s work on Penicillin
notatum. Fleming was absorbed in routine work in bacteriology when an accidental con-
tamination of old petri dishes with mold led to the discovery that penicillin could inhibit
bacterial growth (Hare, 1982). The connection had massive impacts on public health. He
has since been widely quoted as saying, “When I woke up just after dawn on September
28, 1928, I certainly didn’t plan to revolutionize all medicine by discovering the world’s first
antibiotic, or bacteria killer. But I guess that was exactly what I did”.4 This discovery,
of course, also had massive impacts on Fleming’s career. More often, conservative science
is a source of dependable incremental progress. Conservative science tends to be fairly de-
pendable, as well, in terms of whether the scientists who do it receive credit for their work.
The economist developing a new model of household bargaining is fairly likely to be able to
publish their findings in a decent journal, and to use this publication towards tenure and
promotion.
4See Markel (2013).
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Not all sorts of science are dependable in this way. Some projects carry more inherent
risk, in the sense that they may fail to generate successful or publishable findings. Projects
that are very innovative or novel carry further risk in that the investigator may end up
labeled as an outsider (or even a quack), with all the associated career detriments. The
unifying E8 theory, for example, developed by surfer-physicist Garrett Lisi (Lisi, 2007), is
enormously novel and ambitious, but not long after its introduction was rejected by much
of the physics community (Collins, 2008).
On the other hand, it has been widely argued that the sorts of innovative projects that
carry high risks of failure are often those that, when successful, have the greatest scientific
impact. Stanford (2015), for example, has argued that transformative, risky science may
play a special role in theory change in that it is more likely to yield previously unconceived
theories that might lie outside of the scientific mainstream. Thoma (2015) uses ‘epistemic
landscape’ models to argue that the presence of scientists who do innovative research may
improve the outcomes of an entire community.5 Currie (2017) argues that certain areas of
inquiry, such as into existential risks (those that threaten the human race), require especially
innovative methods. Likewise, if E8 had been adopted as a unifying physical theory, it would
have led to a revolution in physics, and massive personal success for Lisi.
So there are reasons to think that pursuing at least some amount of high risk, high
reward science is important to scientific progress, and can lead to great personal reward for
scientists. But, as briefly described in the introduction, the current structure of science may
promote inherently conservative work (Stanford, 2015; Luukkonen, 2012). I now explore a
new potential cause of conservativism in science: selection. The idea, as will become clear,
is that the processes by which new PIs are hired and form labs may select against scientists
who engage in high risk, high reward science.
3. Model
This paper borrows a framework developed by Smaldino and McElreath (2016).6 Their
model simulates a community of scientists with some number of labs, N . Each time step in
their simulations involves two stages: science and evolution. During the science stage, with
some probability each lab completes a project. The likelihood that new research is produced
and published depend on the methodological practices of the lab in question. Smaldino and
McElreath (2016) assume that different practices will be more or less likely to generate
positive results, and more or less likely to identify which of these results are actually false
positives. Labs that generate and publish new results receive some level of credit for their
work, which accumulates over the course of the simulation.
5Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) first developed epistemic landscape models to make this argument, but
see Thoma (2015); Alexander et al. (2015).
6McElreath and Smaldino (2015) give an earlier version of this model, but the one I present here is
closest to Smaldino and McElreath (2016). Holman and Bruner (2018) also describe a selective model of
scientific communities where industry influences the prevalence of methodologies favorable to their interests
by funding labs that use these methodologies.
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During the second stage of each time step, a partially selective process determines how
the make up of the scientific community shifts. First, some number of labs, d, are sampled,
and the eldest of these is selected to ‘die off’. This represents something like the retirement
of a PI in a real community. Then a new set of labs (also of size d) are sampled, and the lab
with the highest accumulated credit ‘replicates’, the idea being that students from successful
labs are more likely to be hired by peer institutions and found labs of their own.7 Smaldino
and McElreath (2016) assume that students will not necessarily form labs exactly like their
mentors, but that there is some influence that extends between advisee and advisor. The
new lab is like the old one modulo some ‘mutation’ of the practices mentioned above.
I will present a novel version of this model adapted to investigate the selection of risky
science. Variation between labs in this model will involve differential tendencies towards
risk taking in science. In particular, I assume that some labs are inherently conservative,
and as a result have a dependable probability of success, pC , and a set credit payoff should
success occur, uC . Some labs are inclined towards risky science, and for these labs the
expected payoff given a success is uR, where it is assumed that uR > uC , or that across
the community the success of a risky project will yield more credit than for a conservative
project.8 The probability that a risky project succeeds, however, will vary from lab to lab.
This is meant to capture a situation where some risk takers happen to develop revolutionary
ideas and projects, which tend to pay off over the course of their scientific careers, whereas
others languish. The probability that each risk-taking lab completes a successful project,
piR, is selected randomly.
The distribution I use ensures that 1) low success rates are common and higher ones less
so and 2) there is an upper limit on the success rate of risky projects so that for all labs
piR < pC (conservative projects succeed more often than all risky projects). This is done
by selecting a random number x from [0, 1] and then taking piR = max(0, cx
2 − f). On the
domain [0, 1] the function cx2 − f is monotonically increasing and convex (meaning that
higher values are increasingly less likely). The constants c and f act as parameters which
control how swiftly the function increases (c) and how many values map to zero probability
of success (f). The value at x = 1 is the maximum piR that can be obtained. When c = .4
and f = .02, for example, the maximum value for piR = .38. For the parameter values I
consider here, there are always some significant percentage of risk-taking labs that have no
chance of success, and the chances are always significantly less than conservative labs. This
is obviously an arbitrary method for assignment of success rates, but any function with a
similar general character should generate qualitatively similar results.
Simulations of this model proceed as follows. First N = 100 labs are initialized to be
either risky or conservative. For simplicity I will always assume that it is equally likely a lab
is conservative or risk-taking at the start of simulation. For each risky lab, a characteristic
7This is similar to the Moran process in biology, described by Moran (1958). This process involves
individuals in a finite population, where at each time step one individual is randomly chosen for death, and
one is chosen for reproduction based on their relative fitnesses.
8As noted with the penicillin case in section 2, this will not always be a good assumption, but it is a
simplification intended to capture the general features of the science at hand. Adding a rare large payoff for
conservative science to the model will not significantly influence results.
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success rate (piR) is chosen. Then, as in the version of the model presented by Smaldino
and McElreath (2016), successive stages of science and evolution proceed. Over time a lab
accumulates credit. At each stage the oldest lab from a random sample of size d ‘dies’, and
the most successful of the second sample of d labs replaces it. Since all conservative labs
have the same success rate and payoff, students of conservative labs inherit the properties of
their parent lab perfectly. They do conservative science with chance of success pC and credit
uC . For risk-taking labs, I explore the possibility that there might be something difficult
to repeat about risky science, so that although students of risk-takers also take risks, their
success rate is chosen anew with some probability. In particular, I define parameter t as the
probability that students inherit the success rate of their adviser. When t = 1, the success
of risk taking, like the success of conservative science, is completely heritable. When t = 0,
there is no correlation between the success rate of a risk-taking advisor and their students.9
Before presenting results from these models, a few comments are in order. The first
regards the interpretation of ‘success’ or ‘payoff’ in these models. Many philosophers of
science have gained insight into the behaviors of scientists by assuming that they are part of
a ‘credit economy’ where they respond to academic credit incentives in the same way normal
people respond to monetary incentives.10 Like ‘utility’ itself, credit in this sense is not a
well-defined notion (except inasmuch as we might define it as the-thing-sought-by-scientists).
It is meant to capture something like high social status within a discipline, fame, attention,
citations, awards, and attendant monetary/professional benefits. The model presented here
likewise assumes that labs accumulate credit of this sort, and that this accumulation helps
determine which labs manage to place students. Notice, though, that while credit to scien-
tists often is associated with scientific advancement caused by their work, this is not always
the case. In other words, high risk, high reward science as modeled here may not completely
overlap with the sorts of revolutionary science that authors like Stanford (2015); Thoma
(2015); Currie (2017) have championed. The models apply best to cases where credit and
scientific advancement are associated.
One further note. As I argued in section 2, the dividing line between ‘conservative’ and
‘high risk-high reward’ science is not always a clear one. In order to study how selective forces
might act on conservatism in science I have operationalized these concepts. In particular,
conservative science in the models here is science that leads to steady, dependable credit
rewards for those who pursue it. High risk, high reward science leads to a lower chance of
receiving a great deal of credit. Given the complexity of the phenomenon modeled, there will
be cases in science where this operationalization, and thus the applicability of the models,
have a better or worse fit.11
9One variation of the model would consider the possibility that students of conservative scientists might
themselves be risk-takers or vice versa. This is certainly realistic. While this change would alter the results,
it would not significantly influence the main conclusions drawn from these models, which are about the
environments under which risk-taking and conservatism come under positive selection pressure.
10See Merton (1973) for more on the credit motives of scientists. Kitcher (1990) presented an early model
of this sort. For more recent examples see Heesen (2017); Bright (2017). Zollman (2018) discusses whether
and when credit motives are a good thing for science.
11Code for the model described in this paper is available at the URL:
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4. Results
For all the simulations reported here, the success rate for conservative labs was pC = .8 and
the credit payoff for a successful conservative project was uC = 1.
12 Payoff for risky science,
uR, was varied from 2 to 20. Parameter c, which controlled how likely it was for risky science
to pay off (higher c corresponding to more risk taking labs with high characteristic chance of
success), was varied from .1 to .4.13 I varied t, the probability that risk-taking labs inherit
the success rate of their parent lab, from 0 to 1. For each set of parameter values, 1000 trials
were run, each with 1000 rounds of science and evolution.
At the end of each simulation, it was noted whether the remaining labs were all conser-
vative, all risk taking, or whether there was some mix of both. The nature of this simulation
is such that with enough time all labs will either be conservative or risk-taking. This is be-
cause the selection process is probabilistic, and eventually this stochasticity will mean that
one of the strategies will die out. Once this happens it will be impossible for the strategy to
re-enter the population since there is no mutation from conservative to risk taking or vice
versa. This is to say that ‘both’ is a temporary state in the model, but it is still meaningful
because in simulations where both strategies are present after 1000 rounds, we know there
is not strong selection for either strategy.
Unsurprisingly, across all simulations risk taking was more likely to flourish when it
generated more credit. Figure 1 shows the proportion of simulations that generated risk-
taking, conservativism or a mix of both as uR increases. As is evident, the larger the payoff
when risky science succeeds, the more likely it is that the selection process in the community
will select for risk-taking. Although this figure represents one set of parameters, for this, and
all other results described, trends were stable across all parameters. An obvious take-away,
though not a surprising one, is that if we wish to promote high risk science, the rewards
for success should be increased relative to rewards for conservative science. Notice that in
this model, increasing credit rewards do not incentivize scientists to switch to risky projects.
Rather this model illustrates the ways that the processes by which new labs are formed will
select for risky science when it generates a lot of credit, apart from the individual preferences
and decisions of scientists. (In this case, of course, the intervention that should promote high
risk, high reward science via selection is the same as the intervention that should incentivize
credit motivated scientists to switch to risky projects.)14
In addition, the greater the chances that risky science pays off (the higher c is), the
greater the probability it is selected for. I will not present figures illustrating this result
https://github.com/cailinmeister/Risky-Science
12It is not important that these parameters were not varied since the relationship between these values for
risky versus conservative labs is what determines whether science in these models tends towards conservatism
or risk taking.
13I kept f = .02, meaning that the percentage of risk-taking labs that were never successful ranged from
about 25-50% depending on c.
14The question of what such an intervention would look like in this case is actually quite a tricky one.
How do we identify which science was high risk, high reward in the first place? How do we give more credit
to those scientists engaged in it? Answering these questions is outside the scope of this paper, but the reader
should be aware of difficulties here. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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Figure 1: Proportions of simulations that select risk-taking, conservative science, or both as the payoffs for
risk-taking increase. For results displayed in this figure c = .2, d = 10, and t = 0.
since it is so unsurprising. Notice, though, that two of the causes of conservatism named
by Stanford (2015)—low funding support and conservatism in peer review—will influence
something like c. If high risk projects are unlikely to get support and are hard to publish,
labs engaging in risky science are less likely to gain credit successes. Again, these factors
should influence choices by scientists who predict that risky projects will be unlikely to get
funding/be published, but they should also influence the selective processes by which new
labs are formed. And, again, in this case, the same incentives should promote high risk,
high reward science via both pathways.
Taken together these two results—regarding the payoff and probability of success for
risky science—indicate that epistemic communities might tend towards conservatism when
those engaged in risky science do not garner the success necessary to pass on their methods
via students. Despite the fact that two trends just described are unsurprising, there is an
aspect of these results that is unexpected. One might think that what does the work in
determining whether risky or conservative science tends to be selected here are the relative
expected payoffs of the two scientific strategies. For conservative science, the chance of
success is always .8 and the credit payoff is 1, so the expected payoff on any round is .8
across the board. For risky science, the expected payoffs across labs must take into account
the variance in their success rates. This expected payoff across labs will be the payoff for
risky science, uR integrated over the various possible chances of success (at least at the
start of simulation).15 But when the expected payoffs for risky and conservative science are
equal, these simulations select risky science. In fact, they select risky science even when its
expected payoff (in this sense) is much lower than that for conservative science.16
15In other words, it will be
∫ 1
x=0
uR ∗ max(0, cx2 − f)dx (see footnote 9 . ).
16Just to give one example, consider the results in figure 1. When uR = 10, conservative and risky science
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Why would this be? Labs that engage in risky science, remember, also generate higher
payoffs when they do succeed. This means that the very best risk-taking labs will have
enormous capacity to generate credit, and so will tend to have accumulated the most payoff
of any labs in the community. In other words, the credit variance of risk taking labs is much
higher, meaning that at the very top of lab performance there will be more risk-takers. At
the very bottom there will be more risk-takers too, but the high performers matter most
in this sort of selective environment.17 They are the ones who found lineages of successful
students and spread risk-taking practices. So, while the risks associated with maverick-y
science can indeed impair its spread, the process by which scientific labs are formed, produce,
and die actually seems to promote the spread of high risk, high reward science.
In the introduction, I briefly mentioned a suggestion from Stanford (2015) that increases
in the severity of competition for scientific positions are likely a factor promoting the rise of
conservative science. The models here do not support this particular claim. One can think
of the size of the sample from which labs are chosen to die and replicate, d, as determining
the strength of selection in these models. At the extremes, if d = 1 death and replication are
always completely random. If d = 100 on the other hand, the oldest lab always dies and the
most successful one always replicates, meaning there is no randomness, but a strong selective
force instead. As the strength of selection in these models increases, perhaps surprisingly,
the emergence of risk-taking becomes more common, not less.
Why? As the strength of selection increases in this way, it is increasingly the case that
only the very top performing labs will ever replicate. Labs with high payoffs, but not the
very peak payoffs, no longer make the cut. And, as discussed, because risk-taking labs have
higher variance in success, the very top performers will tend to be risk-takers. This is the
same general reason that risk-taking derives a relative benefit in these selective processes.
The further observation is that the more competitive the environment, the more the process
will tend to select high risk, high reward science.
Figure 2 shows this trend. On the x-axis, the size of the samples from which labs are
chosen to die and replicate increases. As is evident, as this strength of selection increases,
risk-taking is selected for with increasing frequency.18 Given the simplicity of this model,
it would be premature to take this as definitive evidence that highly competitive academic
are selected equally often, but at this point the expected payoff to risky science integrated over possible
chances of success is .5 (compared to .8 for conservative science). When uR is nearly 16, the expected
payoffs are equal, but at this point risky science is selected in all simulations.
17Smaldino and McElreath (2016) find something similar with respect to the selection of low powered
experiments. Labs that put less effort into preventing false positives also have more time to generate new
work. Even if there is a good chance their work will fail to replicate, and even if there are consequences when
this happens, there will be some labs that by chance never face these consequences. These will generate the
most credit of all labs and their methods will tend to spread.
18One may notice that on the far left of the plot, when d = 2, the proportion of simulations with both
sorts of strategies at the end increases and the proportion of conservative labs goes down. This is because
when d = 2 there is very little selective pressure in this model, so the chances that either strategy dies out
at any stage decrease. When d = 1, so that there is no selection pressure at all, 99% of simulations end with
both strategies present.
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Figure 2: Proportions of simulations that select risk-taking, conservative science, or both as selection pressure
increases. For all results displayed in this figure c = .2, t = .5, and uR = 5.
environments promote high risk, high reward science.19 But this said, these simulations
do suggest that the connection which Stanford (2015) draws between competitive academic
environments and conservatism may be overly hasty. Even if competitive environments pro-
mote conservative decisions making by individual scientists, they seem to have the opposite
effect on selection of conservatism. Notice that this is a case where the process of change
via selection on labs and the process of change via choice by scientists may pull apart.
At this point, the models would seem to suggest that in modern, highly competitive
academic communities even when risk-taking is not a good bet for an individual scientist
(because the expected payoffs are lower than for conservative science) it should nonetheless
tend to spread as the students of the most successful labs found their own. Let us now
explore, though, the possibility that one reason scientific communities might trend towards
conservatism could have to do with the heritability of risky versus conservative strategies in
science. Successful conservative science is often easy to pass down. A reasonably bright stu-
dent of the economist who builds models of household bargaining can likewise build models
of household bargaining. The student of the scientist documenting details of salamander
ecology can likewise document salamander ecology. It is less clear that the student of Ein-
stein can replicate his successes. To capture this feature, I assume that when a risky lab
replicates it sometimes receives a new characteristic probability of success. The idea is that
the student involved has chosen a new, risky project where the probability of success is not
tied to the success of their advisor’s project.
This lack of heritability does indeed inhibit the emergence of risky science in these models.
19It would be especially premature because this model does not capture the fact that young investigators
often must publish on their own in a short period of time in order to get a job. This might increase selection
pressure for projects that are more likely to yield a dependable success given a limited amount of time.
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Figure 3: Proportions of simulations that select risk-taking, conservative science, or both as the heritability
of payoffs to risk taking increases. For these results, uR = 7, d = 10, and c = .2
The reason is that in models where the success rate is heritable, the risk-taking labs that tend
to do well are those that happen to have a high characteristic rate of success. Their methods
spread across the community as students with the same high rates of success form their own
labs, publish, gain credit, and train their own students. Notice that this also means that
over the course of simulation risky science becomes less risky on average. In models without
heritability, a lab with a high success rate will generate successful students that get their own
labs, but their success rates, on average, are no higher than other risk takers. This prevents
thriving academic lineages from spreading high-risk, high-reward science throughout the
community.
Figure 3 demonstrates this trend. On the x-axis we have the heritability of the success
rate of risk taking labs, t. As the heritability increases, it is increasingly likely that risk-
taking emerges. When the heritability of success is low, on the other hand, conservativism
tends to dominate. The take-away here is that inasmuch as it is difficult to transfer the
success of a high risk, high reward project on to graduate students, scientific communities
may trend towards conservative projects where successful methods can be passed on.
This conclusion about heritability complicates a claim made previously in this section:
that simply increasing the payoffs for risky science should promote it. The models without
heritability make clear that things are not so straightforward. PIs who get a lot of credit for
their successful high-risk, high reward science may spread these practices through successful
students. But if their students are not able to replicate their successes, the process stops
there.
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5. Conclusion
The models presented here are highly simplified, even in comparison to those that inspired
them in Smaldino and McElreath (2016). As Weisberg (2012) points out, no model can
capture every desideratum a modeler might have (such as being maximally simple and
maximally realistic). The goal here was to favor simplicity over realism in order to make
the models tractable, easy to understand, and to get a clear picture of the causal processes
occurring in the simulations. For this reason, it is appropriate to be explicit about the ways
they can and cannot inform our understanding of epistemic communities, and the selection
of conservative science.
I take these models to be doing three main things. First, they provide an aid to reasoning
and thought experiment. Simulations are not strictly necessary to generate and defend a
hypothesis such as ‘if the success of risky science tends to be less heritable, it may be less
likely to spread’. However, the simulations here extend human reasoning capacity in order to
make clear that the logic of this hypothesis holds up.20 In addition, the models challenge an
argument that seems plausible and defensible—that academic competition should increase
conservatism. In this challenge, the models are instrumental as an aid to reasoning, since
their outcome is surprising, even if it is not hard to grasp the logic of the result once it has
been outlined.
The second role I take these models to be playing is in ‘how-possibly’ explanation. Dray
(1957) was the first to draw a distinction between ‘how-possibly’ explanations—intended
to refute claims of impossibility—and ‘how-actually’ explanations.21 The models here make
clear how considerations other than the rational choices of individual scientists can be enough
to drive an epistemic community towards conservative science. In particular, they make clear
that heritability, a factor which often comes apart from credit rewards, can possibly influ-
ence the emergence of scientific strategies. Given that funding bodies such as the NIH have
explicitly set out to promote high risk, high reward science, it is appropriate to tune into
all the sorts of features of a scientific community that might lead to scientists avoiding such
research. The models here introduce the possibility that some of these features may derive
from larger structures of scientific communities, and may require different sorts of interven-
tions in the interest of promoting high risk, high reward science. The third role the models
play is connected to the second but more general. They help illustrate how, in principle,
selective forces in scientific communities can act separately from processes of change via
choice by individual scientists. This bolsters claims by Smaldino and McElreath (2016);
Holman and Bruner (2018) that selection can importantly shape scientific communities.
Of course, these models do not capture aspects of scientific behavior derived from rational
choice, either motivated by credit or by epistemic goals. For example, Currie (2017) points
20Farrell and Lewandowsky (2010) defend the use of simulations as an aid to reasoning in psychology. As
they point out, generating simulations of a phenomenon forces scientists to be precise about what they are
talking about, and to use shared language and assumptions. They also help scientists avoid cognitive biases
such as confirmation bias, and to avoid problems with limitations in human memory and computational
capacity.
21Gru¨ne-Yanoff (2013) gives a good description of the use of models in ‘how-possibly’ explanations.
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out that risk-averse students may be unwilling to join labs engaged in risky projects, and
that PIs may avoid risk-taking to protect the students and postdoc under their supervision.
To be clear, the models presented here are intended to complement such work with a clearer
picture of the other features of scientific communities that influence risk-taking, not to
supplant them.
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